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Abstract 
 
Network analysis techniques remain rarely used for understanding international management          
strategies. Our paper highlights their value as research tool in this field of social science using a large set                   
of micro-data (20,000) to investigate the presence of networks of subsidiaries overseas. The research              
question is the following: to what extent did/do global Japanese business networks mirror             
organizational models existing in Japan? 
In particular, we would like to assess how much the links building such business networks are                
shaped by the structure of big-size industrial conglomerates of firms headquartered in Japan, also              
described as HK.  
The major part of the academic community in the fields of management and industrial organization               
considers that formal links can be identified among firms belonging to HK. Miwa and Ramseyer (Miwa                
and Ramseyer 2002; Ramseyer 2006) challenge this claim and argue that the evidence supporting the               
existence of HK is weak.  
So far, quantitative empirical investigation has been conducted exclusively using data for firms             
incorporated in Japan. Our study tests the Miwa-Ramseyer hypothesis (MRH) at the global level using               
information on the network of Japanese subsidiaries overseas. We identify linkages among Japanese             
subsidiaries overseas using an objective criterion: the subsidiaries share at least two Japanese             
co-investors (firms headquartered in Japan). The results obtained lead us to reject the MRH for the                
global dataset, as well as for subsets restricted to the two main regions/countries of destination of                
Japanese foreign investment: China (broadly defined as to include Hong Kong and Taiwan), and              
Southeast Asia. The results are robust to the weighting of the links, with different specifications, and are                 
observed in most industrial sectors; the main exception is the automotive industry for which a               
straightforward explanation (unrelated to the MRH) exists. The global Japanese network became            
increasingly complex during the late 20th century as a consequence of increase in the number of                
Japanese subsidiaries overseas but the key features of the structure remained rather stable. We draw               
implications of these findings for academic research in international business and for professionals             
involved in corporate strategy.  
 
I. Introduction 
 
The heuristic and explanatory power of network analysis techniques is widely acknowledged in             
various disciplines of social science (Scott, 1999; Padgett & Powell, 2012). They remain however rarely               
used for the empirical analysis of international management strategies, except in a few recent studies               
based on relatively small samples (e.g. ​Shi, Sun, Pinkham & Peng, 2014; ​for a review, see Hoang and Yi                   
2015). This remark applies also to academic research in management but also, surprisingly, to              
professional strategic consulting and business auditing activities. The results presented in the volume             
edited by David & Westerhuis (2014) demonstrate that a strong interest is emerging for studies with                
country-level historical perspective, including on Japan (​Koibuchi & Okazaki 2014)​.  
Our paper highlights the value of network analysis as a valuable research tool in international               
business with a study using a large sample of micro-data for the global network of Japanese subsidiaries                 
overseas. The topic we investigate is related to an unsettled issue in Japanese business history that                
remains entirely relevant for analyzing present-day Japanese business strategies at home and abroad.  
Specifically, we investigate if the structure of Japanese business networks is reminiscent of the              
corresponding horizontal conglomerates (HK). The majority of the academic community in the fields of              
management and industrial organization considers that the links between firms belonging to these HK              
can be identified through information on main-bank, cross-ownership, and transactions (e.g. Gerlach            
1992; Aoki and Saxonhouse 2000). Miwa and Ramseyer (Miwa and Ramseyer 2002; Ramseyer 2006)              
challenge this claim, arguing the evidence supporting the hypothesis is weak. Alternatively, they             
interpret it as an ideological construct that was firstly devised by Japanese Marxists in the 1950s to be,                  
later on, adopted by the Dodwell, a marketing company, and which was finally endorsed by non-Marxist                
scholars as well. As a concluding remark, it is worth stressing that quantitative empirical investigation               
have been conducted, up to now, exclusively using data for firms incorporated in Japan.  
Our paper tests the Miwa-Ramseyer hypothesis (MRH) at the global level using information on              
Japanese subsidiaries overseas. The data are obtained from a nearly exhaustive global survey of              
Japanese overseas subsidiaries conducted by a private company, the Toyo Keizai Shinposha. Their             
dataset (henceforth TKZ) includes more than 20,000 firms in total, of which around 6,000 in the                
manufacturing sector, the one relevant to our analysis. The coverage is global and includes all recipient                
countries of Japanese foreign direct investment. The TKZ database reports information for wholly owned              
companies or joint ventures with local partners. Available information enables identifying Japanese and             
non-Japanese investors, and the shares owned by each firm. Membership of Japanese parent companies              
in one of the HK is defined on the basis of two indicators also supplied by TKZ: involvement regular                   
meetings and equity ownership by firms identified core members of the HK. We use community               
detection techniques with different specifications and subsets of data in order to assess robustness of               
our results. Although with some caveats, the results obtained lead us to reject the MRH.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section II offers an overview of the state of                  
the art in business network analysis, and identifies some major gaps in the literature; section III                
describes the TKZ dataset; section IV describes the hypotheses under investigation; section V describes              
the strategy adopted to test the MRH and discusses the results; section VI summarizes the findings and                 
elaborates on their implications for scholars and managers.  
 
II. Non-Japanese and Japanese business networks:      
state of the art and gaps in the literature 
 
The major part of the studies on business networks remain focused on the analysis of relatively                
simple networks, either of centered on one particular firm, or using a small sample of observations.  
What are the reasons for this limited development of complex network analysis in management,              
compared to other fields of social science, in particular economics or sociology? The three major               
intertwined explanations seems related to the strong focus typical of studies in management: (a)              
qualitative techniques (Harvard Business School type case studies), (b) intra-firm networks, and (c)             
directed networks (as opposed to undirected networks that are usually the more complex ones). 
First, qualitative techniques enable analyzing extremely complex conditions, structures and           
strategies, but usually for one particular firm or, at best (from the viewpoint of network analysis), for a                  
relatively small group of firms (e.g. ​Forsgren & Johanson 1992)​. In some minority cases, the scope is a                  
little wider since the interactions of financial holdings and other investors are taken into account on the                 
basis of information of equity holding.  
The focus on intra-firm networks is a legacy of a tradition in management going back to                
Chandler (1962, 1977) that analyses the firm structural changes in response to the top management               
decisions meant to adjust corporate business strategies.  
Finally, the focus on directed networks is also perfectly understandable: business networks are             
viewed essentially as centered on a group of top managers. The types of inter-firms networks               
considered are mostly hierarchical pyramids of firms linked by equity ownership relations with different              
tiers corresponding to subsidiaries of first, second, third, or ​N​th rank. An interest for studies taking into                 
account both strong and weak business ties using network analysis is however emerging recently              
(Kilkenny and Fuller-Love 2014). 
In this context, the specialized sub-field of studies on Japanese business networks stands aside.              
The theory of the Japanese firm as a nexus of treaties formulated by Aoki (1984a, 1984b) emerged at                  
the time when Japanese business networks were barely discussed (​the book by Kono 1984 on the                
strategy and structure of Japanese enterprises, one of the most widely circulated in English around that                
period, does not mention business networks at all). Aoki’s game-theoretical approach, although            
concentrated on intra-firm aspects, was very influential, as it provided an analytical framework             
applicable to undirected inter-firm networks. This solid conceptual bases enabled the development of an              
empirical stream of research that was later identified as k​eiretsu studies (in particular ​Gerlach 1992;               
Lincoln, Gerlach & Takahashi 1992; Lincoln, Gerlach & Ahmadjian 1996; Weinstein & Yafeh 1995; ​Aoki               
and Saxonhouse 2000; ​Nakamura 2002; ​Lincoln & Gerlach 2004). McGuire & Dow (2009) provides the               
most extensive recent survey of this stream of research.  
The Japanese term keiretsu, which is usually translated as ‘alignment’ indicates that a firm has a                
set of preferential cooperations with another firm, generally bigger and in that case the relation is                
clearly hierarchical, or with a group of firms. The relation of the firm with this group can be either                   
hierarchical, as aforementioned, or not hierarchical, in this latter case the firm is a member of an                 
undirected network. In the case of hierarchical relations between firms, the structure is the same as in                 
vertically organised business groups that exist in all regions of the world. This pattern is described in                 
Japanese business studies as vertical keiretsu (VK), while the undirected network is described as              
horizontal keiretsu (HK). It should be noted, however, that there are overlaps between VK and HK.                
Specialized manufacturing groups sur as Toyota and Mitsubishi are vertically organized and, at the same               
time, they are part of an HK (Mitsui and Mitsubishi keiretsu, respectively.) 
The development of the Keiretsu studies led, among other consequences, to revive the interest              
in Japanese business history studies investigating the strategies and structures of ​prewar groups owned              
by kinship networks, i.e. zaibatsu such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda, dissolved in 1946               
upon request of the U.S. occupation authorities. An obvious issue was assessing the strength of post-                
war links between companies that belonged to these pre-war groups and that morphed in the 1950s                
into HK type conglomerates whose membership was somehow different from the Zaibatsu’s (see also              
Ramseyer & Miwa (2007) for a discussion on the dissolution of pre-war zaibatsu)​. Ironically, the               
expansion of the literature on HK accelerated in the 1990s and 2000s, precisely at the time when the                  
ties were becoming increasingly informal and weak. What is more, the description of the structure of HK                 
became obsolete as a consequence of waves of ​mega-mergers of the major Japanese banks that took                
place in 2006. This led some of the key figures in the Keiretsu studies to reflect on their demise (“why                    
they are gone?”) and the future of Japanese business groups (e.g. Lincoln & Shimotani (2009); see also                 
McGuire & Dow (2009) for a similar discussion).  
Looking at studies concerning Japanese business network overseas, we can observe that a             
number of papers are explicitly referring to keiretsu membership for investigating various issues such              
investment overseas (Belderbos and Sleuwaegen 1996), as spatial location decision and agglomeration            
effects (e.g. Belderbos, & Sleuwaegen 2002, Yamashita, N., Matsuura & Nakajima 2014). Zhang, M. M.               
(2015). A few papers also discuss the importance of keiretsu in shaping Japanese business networks               
overseas, in some case using the large datasets such as the TKZ database (e.g. Zhang 2015). However, to                  
the best of our knowledge, there has been no attempt so far to use standard network analysis                 
techniques to unravel the structure of Japanese networks overseas and our study aims at filling this gap. 
 
III. Dataset and descriptive statistics  
 
The TKZ dataset we use actually is composed by two datasets, both produced by the Toyo Keizai                 
Shinposha, a private company whose denomination in English is Oriental Economist           
(​http://corp.toyokeizai.net/en/​). One of the attractive features of this database is that it has not been               
constructed by the Japanese government or a not-for-profit semi-public body, but rather by a private               
company: henceforth, their quality and accuracy was meant to generate a positive return on              
investment. Thus, that these volumes are rather best sellers than confidential publications is indicative              
of such quality and of the trust the public had in the information supplied. The surveys have been                  
repeated yearly since more than 50 years on the basis of voluntary participation. 
The first database reports micro-data resulting from a yearly survey administered in 2005 to              
Japanese subsidiaries based overseas (a sizeable 20.700), circulated in the 2006 TKZ edition that we use                
for reasons explained below. The firms respond on a voluntary basis, and some piece of information is                 
sporadically missing in the returned forms, collected and processed by Toyo Keizai. The sampling rate is                
not disclosed by the Toyo Keizai, but the consensus is that coverage is extremely high because the                 
respondents are not expected to report confidential information. The list of data requested is limited to                
the denomination, address, industrial sector, paid-up capital, name and share of each Japanese equity              
owner, and share of local investors, when joint ventures are established with local foreign partners;               
notably, the respondents are not required to disclose the identity of the local partners. Toyo Keizai                
processes the information as to include a unique code for each subsidiary and, more importantly, for                
equity owners (companies headquartered in Japan; no code for local investor). The equity owners              
univocal coding system aptly implemented by Toyo Keizai prevents any risk of confusion due to               
mislabelling: the local subsidiaries managers responding to the survey are held back from using possibly               
inconsistent textual denominations. Since we had the chance to access the electronic version of the               
2006 database (more often than not, the printed version is used), there is no risk of error or omission (at                    
least not by our research team).  
We process the information available in the database to identify conglomerates of Japanese             
overseas businesses, by defining a quantitative and objective criterion: two Japanese investors (firms             
headquartered in Japan) are considered to be linked (as nodes connected by an edge on the graph) if                  
they co-invest in, i.e. they co-own, one or more overseas subsidiaries.  
These co-ownership relations are of utmost relevance since they are ​measurable in stark             
contrast with relations between firms only of informal cooperation and/or repeated transactions,            
without any equity ownership tie. 
As side note, a subsidiary may be involved in more than one business network. Thus, such                
shared subsidiaries heuristically play the role of “bridges” between two networks, therefore they             
contribute to the network cohesion. For the interested reader, such links are related to the concept of                 
weak ties​  (Granovetter 1973).  
Furthermore, the advantage, among others, of the TKZ dataset is to include information on              
mid-size groups. However, after 2006, the mega-mergers of some Japanese banks disrupted such fine              
scale structure and for this reason we focus our analysis on the pre-2006 networks. The implications of                 
our results on pre-2006 networks for analyzing present day conditions are discussed in section VI. 
The second Toyo Keizai database we use, much smaller, has been obtained from the last issue                
(published in 2000) of the Toyo Keizai “Keiretsu Survey” (a distinct product from the Toyo Keizai                
yearbook on industrial groups, published yearly). It provides very valuable information on the 6 big HK:                
Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Sanwa, Fuyo, and Ikkan, that can be considered as the indirect heirs of                
kinship-based zaibatsu (“financial cliques”) such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumitomo, that were            
dissolved in 1947. Relying on information obtained from Toyo Keizai (2000), we retain two criteria for                
membership in one of the 6 HK: (i) the firm is a member of one of the 6 Chief Executive Officers “clubs”                      
(one per HK) meeting on a weekly/monthly basis; (ii.) the firm is among the top 50 companies by share                   
of equity ownership of companies members of one of the 6 “clubs”. To the best of our knowledge, the                   
Toyo Keizai did not officially explain why the publication Keiretsu survey has been discontinued, the               
2000 issue being the last one. ​Two alternative interpretations can be considered. The first one, which                
can be considered consistent with the Miwa-Ramseyer view, is that the ​Toyo Keizai ​finally acknowledged               
the fallacy in the Keiretsu existence nowadays. The second one, which we tend to favor, is that drastic                  
changes in the organizational structure of Japanese business networks (in Japan, and - presumably and               
consequently - abroad) resulted in a dying out of the preferential links and cooperation networks that                
had been identified earlier. The information reported in the Keiretsu volume was therefore becoming              
less relevant and, at any rate, redundant with the one provided in the separate Toyo Keizai volume on                  
business groups, more focused on the concept of vertical keiretsu. In particular, as aforementioned, the               
2006 mega mergers of a number of Japanese banks rendered less and less relevant keeping a list of firm                   
memberships in a “club”. 
Nevertheless, the 2000 database provided by the latest issue of the “Keiretsu Survey” is valuable               
to our study as it provided us with the backbone underlying the keiretsu web we test our hypothesis                  
against.  
Thus, summing up, the two dataset together concur to build a coherent perspective: from the               
first dataset we extract with network analysis tools, described in Sec. V, the granularity of the Japanese                 
business network, i.e., its communities structure; on the other hand, we compare this empirical              
evidence of communities against the “Keiretsu Survey” dataset to infer if such communities mirror the               
HK organization. 
 
III.1 Worldwide waves of investment 
Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) did not took place in parallel in all regions of the world,                 
but rather in successive waves. Japanese investors were first attracted in the 1960s and 1970s by the                 
comparative advantages of ASEAN countries, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and the possibility to gain access               
to these emerging markets. From the 1970s, and especially during the 1980s, North America and Europe                
also became important destinations. Finally, the gradual opening of the People’s Republic of China to               
international trade and foreign investors in the 1980s resulted in a reorientation of Japanese foreign               
direct investment that accelerated in the 2000s; China became the main target country in terms of                
flows, and - after some time lag - also in terms of stock. Evidence from the TKZ is presented in ​Figure 1​. 
 
Figure 1. Japanese co-investment overseas (number of firms in 1965, 1975, 1985, 1995, and 2005; log                
scale) 
 
 
Note: The 10 countries of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) are: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia,                
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.  
 
III.2 Heterogeneity in ownership and prevalence of manufacturing 
The ratio of TKZ subsidiaries which are included and used in reconstructing the Japanese              
investors business networks vary manifestly by country. This is both because of the overall quota of                
manufacturing enterprises (very low in the EU, high in ASEAN countries, cfr. ​Figure 2​), and the ratio of                  
single owned subsidiaries (very high in the EU, lower in ASEAN countries, ​cfr. Tables 3.a, 3.b​, below).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. % of Japanese FDI in USD (source: TKZ), by macroarea, all sectors vs. manufacturing only 
 
 
As mentioned previously, non-manufacturing businesses are not included. This is ostensibly visible in the              
most extreme cases, the Netherlands and Indonesia respectively (cfr. ​Table 1​).  
 
 
Table 1. Frequencies of firms by country: full TKZ dataset (TOT), firms included (INCL), % difference;                
first 20 countries sorted by decreasing TOT 
 
Country TOT INCL DIFF% 
China 4.414 3.497 -21% 
USA 3.419 1.194 -65% 
Thailand 1.534 1.116 -27% 
Hong Kong 1.109 254 -77% 
Singapore 1.036 276 -73% 
Taiwan 907 520 -43% 
United Kingdom 806 188 -77% 
Malaysia 774 516 -33% 
Korea 682 453 -34% 
Indonesia 673 571 -15% 
Germany 637 126 -80% 
Philippines 453 274 -40% 
Australia 402 69 -83% 
France 380 123 -68% 
Netherlands 358 56 -84% 
Canada 266 91 -66% 
Brazil 261 137 -48% 
Viet Nam 250 200 -20% 
Mexico 219 124 -43% 
India 199 157 -21% 
(61 more countries omitted) (...) (...) (...) 
TOT 20.488 10.481 -49% 
 
 
 
III.3 Heterogeneity in subsidiaries size and capitalization 
As it will become noticeable in the analysis, geographical and sectoral peculiarities are evident in               
the dataset, and play a relevant role in shaping the topological features of networks built from                
disaggregated data. In ​Tables 2.a, 2.b​, descriptive data are shown over both dimensions. 
 
Table 2.a. Average number of employees (NEMPL) and capitalization (K), disaggregated by macroarea 
 
 
Area NUMEMPL K 
ASEAN 518 21.980 
China and Taiwan 366 12.204 
EU 331 20.191 
Northern America 401 37.900 
 
 
Table 2.b. Average number of employees (NEMPL) and capitalization (K), disaggregated by industrial             
sector 
 
 
Industrial sector Code NUMEMPL K 
Food 600 346 24.781 
Textiles 700 380 5.117 
Wood and Furniture 800 323 12.252 
Pulp and Paper 900 246 31.144 
Publishing and Printing 1000 159 283 
Chemicals and Pharma 1100 167 18.894 
Petroleum and Coal Products (incl. Plastics) 1200 55 66.326 
Rubber and Leather Products 1300 258 6.185 
Refractories and Glass 1400 477 6.859 
Steel 1500 313 140.409 
Non-ferrous Metals 1600 545 37.619 
Metal Products 1700 218 11.905 
Machinery 1800 236 11.244 
Electric and Electronic Machinery and Devices 1900 832 27.436 
Transport Machinery and Shipbuilding 2000 308 28.089 
Automobiles and Parts 2100 563 31.848 
Precision Machinery 2200 541 11.677 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 2300 253 4.531 
 
 
III.4 Co-investments 
Globally, every subsidiary is owned by approximately one and a half (1.48) investors, unevenly              
split between Japanese (1.31) and local (0.17). In ​Table 3.a​, this information is disaggregated by               
geographical macro-area; the European Union, where less than one fifth (17%) of the subsidiaries are               
owned by two or more investors, appears to be the area with the least average number of investors,                  
closely followed by Northern America. 
 
Table 3.a. Co-investors per subsidiary, disaggregated by geographical area 
 
Area Avg 1 2 3 4 5+ (%) 2+ 
ASEAN 1.66 1.530 553 259 99 58 39% 
China and Taiwan 1.52 2.190 774 281 86 37 35% 
EU 1.21 648 102 20 6 1 17% 
Northern America 1.28 967 189 55 8 3 21% 
 
 
Table 3.b ​shows a very high ratio of extensively co-owned firms for a few sectors (e.g. textile,                 
where more than half of the subsidiaries are co-owned by two or more investors), whereas               
single-ownership appears to be the norm for others (e.g. precision machinery, including one eighth of               
co-owned subsidiaries only). 
 
Table 3.b. Co-investors per subsidiary, disaggregated by industrial sector 
 
Industrial sector Code Average 1 2 3 4 5+ (%) 2+ 
Food 600 1.59 306 101 48 18 7 36% 
Textiles 700 1.83 252 151 74 30 7 51% 
Wood and Furniture 800 1.57 52 14 5 1 4 32% 
Pulp and Paper 900 1.81 47 34 15 1 3 53% 
Publishing and Printing 1000 1.11 50 4 1 0 0 9% 
Chemicals and Pharma 1100 1.52 995 343 120 40 18 34% 
Petroleum and Coal Products (incl. 
Plastics) 1200 2.05 9 3 4 3 0 53% 
Rubber and Leather Products 1300 1.41 177 42 24 4 0 28% 
Refractories and Glass 1400 1.42 174 53 17 5 1 30% 
Steel 1500 2.27 74 50 39 15 16 62% 
Non-ferrous Metals 1600 1.59 155 43 21 10 5 34% 
Metal Products 1700 1.63 261 112 40 22 5 41% 
Machinery 1800 1.38 803 194 55 16 13 26% 
Electric and Electronic Machinery and 
Devices 1900 1.26 1518 272 68 14 8 19% 
Transport Machinery and Shipbuilding 2000 1.54 43 20 8 1 0 40% 
Automobiles and Parts 2100 1.64 767 339 135 42 20 41% 
Precision Machinery 2200 1.15 224 30 2 0 1 13% 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 2300 1.23 279 41 10 3 1 16% 
 
 
 
IV. Hypotheses 
 
Before starting our analysis, we would like to briefly sketch the underlying hypotheses to our               
approach that guided us and which were, as we explain in the following, mostly driven by the available                  
information provided by the dataset, as in the case of the geographical distribution of the Japanese                
foreign investments, and by sensible heuristical observations on the data’s nature. 
 
Hypothesis 1: considering the manufacturing firms included in the TKZ dataset in all countries for 2005,                
we reject the strong form of the Miwa-Ramseyer hypothesis. 
 
With regard to the Miwa-Ramseyer Hypothesis (MRH), we adopt an agnostic view. Indeed, we              
accept their claim that the empirical evidence supporting the existence of HK is rather weak.  
These business groups would be particularly difficult to identify should the affiliations be             
informal, implying that they would not require any kind of binding and irreversible commitment​.              
Moreover, anecdotal evidence indicates that a number of firms that were identified as informal              
members of one HK gradually shifted to an equally informal affiliation with another HK. What is more, a                  
number of firms loosely related to a HK eventually moved to a position of dual affiliation.  
Therefore, it is not surprising that the evidence obtained using panel data analysis or similar               
econometric techniques could be disappointing. However, we do not reject the possibility that a nexus               
of bilateral or multilateral treaties and repeated transactions between firms, as well as information              
exchanges, involvement in joint R&D projects, and cooperation in joint ventures at home and abroad               
could result in the formation of an indirect business network involving tightly knit clusters of firms.                
Furthermore, one of the main advantages of network analysis in this context is to be consistent with the                  
possibility of informal affiliation and/or changes in affiliation. Our first hypothesis is that Japanese              
business networks overseas tend to replicate familiar structures already in place in Japan when HK had                
very few foreign subsidiaries, that is in the 1960s and 1970s. Accordingly, what we would describe as a                  
strong form of MRH (“[...] at root, the keiretsu do not exist.” in Miwa and Ramseyer prose), can be                   
rejected. 
 
Hypothesis 2: the structure of Japanese business networks overseas is becoming gradually more             
complex but the identified key-players remained essentially the same ones during the period 1975-2005. 
 
To what extent did the structure of Japanese business networks overseas evolved over time?              
The firms setting up foreign subsidiaries in the 1960s and 1970s have been overwhelmingly the biggest                
players in their industry, and in their respective HK, if we believe the proponents of the strong form of                   
the horizontal keiretsu hypothesis (HKH). It is only with the dramatic increase in volume of foreign direct                 
investment that mid-size firms (or Japanese-based firms situated in the periphery of the HK, according to                
the the strong form of HKH proponents) became present as parent companies of foreign subsidiaries.               
Since our measure of involvement in a Japanese business network overseas is defined precisely as the                
co-investment in foreign subsidiaries with other Japanese investors, we expect to find a high level of                
stability in the structure observed using information successive benchmark years. We selected four             
benchmark years with a 10-year interval between them: 1975, 1985, 1995, and 2005.  
 
Hypothesis 3:​ consistent results are expected with or without weighting. 
 
Weighted networks may provide an alternative insight as to the business links used to identify               
groups of firms on the network. Instead of mere binary yes/no relationships, a metric can be put in place                   
to define the links between any two investors, in terms of a continuum measuring the strength of their                  
economic ties. For instance, when considering the shared set of subsidiaries common to two investors,               
as an example of the weight, both the capitalization and the owned share must be taken into                 
consideration. See section V.3 for details. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Similar results (rejection of the MRH) are expected, even when considered separately, for               
three out of the four main (in terms of destination of Japanese foreign investment) world               
macro-regions: ASEAN, China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan), and North America. Not enough             
observations are available for Europe, on the other hand, in order to present conclusive results. 
 
As observed in Section III.1, foreign investments for Japanese firms historically proceeded by             
successive waves, first hitting ASEAN countries, to then spread to North America and Europe and, finally,                
to China. However, if the architecture of the Japanese business networks in these different regions of                
the world was determined by characteristics of the links between Japanese parent companies, we would               
expect to find similar results.  
 
Hypothesis 5: When considering the peculiar structure of some industrial sectors, similar results may              
not be observed in all of them.  
 
The investors and subsidiaries involved in the Japanese business networks overseas specialised in             
different lines of business. That is also the case of the big conglomerates (HK). However, the major part                  
of the co-investments are likely to associate firms of the same industrial sectors, in particular in the                 
manufacturing sector. Depending on the number of potential partners and the advantages derived from              
co-investments in foreign subsidiaries in terms of information sharing and risk mitigation, it is              
conceivable that firms that would be normally competitors may decide to cooperate in order to               
penetrate a foreign market. It is therefore plausible that such a specific pattern, contradicting the               
general trend, is observed in some sectors, e.g. automotive, food and textile. 
V. Methodology 
V.1 Community detection on inferred business network 
We test the MRH using a standard network community detection technique (Blondel et al. 2008)               
on the reconstructed co-investment graph described in Sec. III, matching the communities each node              
(firm) is assigned to, and information on real-world business conglomerates (keiretsu), in order to              
evaluate to what extent the communities detected in the networks correspond to communities defined              
by at least one of the criteria of membership of one of the 6 big HK obtained from Toyo Keizai (2000).  
The results are tested against networks which are equivalent, degree-wise, but with randomized             
structure (Configuration Models, Newman 2003, as null hypotheses). Absence of significant correlation            
between communities and keiretsu is consistently shown in the latter case. 
The network is built using Japanese investors appear as nodes, which are linked if they share                
investments in at least N subsidiaries. Figure 3 offers an insight of the role of subsidiaries in structuring                  
clusters of Japanese investors. 
 
Figure 3. Heterogeneous network, including Japanese investors and overseas subsidiaries, ASEAN           
countries only 
 
Note: red and grey nodes represent, respectievly, Japanese investors and subsidiaries; sizes are arbitrary              
and equal within each category, in order to better reveal the underlying network structure. 
Zoomable version available at ​http://perso.ens-lyon.fr/matteo.morini/jpbusnet/Het_ic.pdf ; industrial       
codes (see Table 3.b) are readable as labels in the online version. 
 
Both parent companies in Japan and subsidiaries overseas are reliably identified by            
unambiguous Toyo Keizai codes. Data on foreign local partners is also available, but their identification is                
hardly consistent due to the absence of unique identifiers; many generic “anonymous” nodes also              
appear. At any rate, their contribution to the network structure appears negligible (cfr. III.4), which led                
us to finally omit this information in order to avoid unpredictable bias.  
The main purpose of representing TKZ microdata as a network of co-investments is to look for                
“more densely connected” sets of firms which are, by definition, communities. Firms tend to cluster               
together in the network structure ​if there are prevalent and privileged economic links between them. If                
we observe a non-random distribution (systematic overrepresentation) of firms known to belong to a              
Keiretsu across communities, we can conclude that the economic structure revealed by the network              
topology is driven by Keiretsu-type inter-firm bonds. 
Our hypothesis can be tested by contrasting two different characteristics of every firm: on the               
one hand, a firm can be a member of either one of the Big 6 Keiretsu groups; on the other, it belongs to                       
one of the communities derived from the network structure. We seek to verify the independence (or                
lack thereof) between the economic network, as resulting from the community detection method             
described above, and the Keiretsu structure. 
Figure 4 displays the bivariate joint frequencies of firms on both Keiretsu and community              
categories as a heatmap, for the global dataset, including manufacturing firms worldwide. Hints of a               
non-random distribution of firms across the two categories, to be validated statistically (see sec. V.2),               
are visible in the image. Mitsubishi- and Sumitomo-bound investors, for instance, are ostensibly             
concentrated in two communities. 
 
Figure 4. Bivariate joint frequencies of Japanese investors; worldwide, manufacturing sector 
 
 V.2 Independence test 
An associative measure must be put to use; since we are dealing with categorical data, the                
Pearson Chi-Square test, including some case-specific safeguards, have been deemed as appropriate. It             
has been applied to the resulting two way table, to assess whether there is any interdependence                
between the two attributes (this being the alternative hypothesis H​a​, if the null hypothesis of               
independence H​0​ can be rejected). 
Moving on to assess the ​test validity, we observe that ​the population is fairly large, and lends                 
itself to an in-depth analysis of subsets of interest. However, in a few specific instances (e.g. “Europe”                 
macro-region, “Food industry” industrial sector) the number of selected observations is barely            
adequate. For the sake of robustness, a double line of defense has been put into place: first, a key                   
characteristic of the Louvain community detection method has been leveraged in order to increase the               
number of observations: being based on a stochastic algorithm, repeated runs (1.000 iterations, in this               
case) return slightly different partitions, which can be accumulated into a richer dataset (and averaged               
out, to keep from artificially inflating the sample size, biasing the test); second, the Chi-Square p-values                
have been computed by Monte Carlo simulation (Tate and Hyer 1973, Bradley and Cutcomb 1977). 
V.3 Business ties as weighted links 
The strength of business ties, in weighted networks, is measured as Cosine Similarity (Salton and               
McGill 1983). CS compares the distribution of the capital invested by pairs of co-owners into               
subsidiaries: a perfect match (e.g. K​a,1 ​= K​b,1​; K​a,2 ​= K​b,2​; ... K​a,n ​= K​b,n​, where K​PC,S is the capital K invested by                       
the parent company PC in subsidiary S) corresponds to a CS = 1; as the allocation choices diverge, CS                   
approaches zero. Technically, it is a measure of the angle between the two vectors, and its purpose is to                   
offer a proportional representation of the connection between investing firms going beyond the binary              
idea of connected vs. unconnected. 
 
 
VI. Results and discussion 
 
Timewise, it appears that, after the first, sparsely populated 1975 snapshot, a period of strong               
correlation (rejection of the MRH), ensues, encompassing the following decades (1985 and 1995             
snapshots). In 2005, right before the mega-mergers occur, evidence starts to wane. 
Geographically, an indisputable difference is observable between macro-areas with medium to           
strong significance (Asean countries, China and Taiwan, Northern America) and one area where there is               
no evidence for the persistence of HK structures at all (Europe). 
When a disaggregated analysis is performed by industrial activity, the only, albeit extremely             
sizeable, sector with unambiguously strong correlation is “chemical”; “textile” does not offer a strong              
enough evidence for the existence of HK (there appears to be a very weak correlation for the                 
unweighted network case); the independence hypothesis cannot be rejected for “food” either, since the              
small number of observations keeps us from achieving robust and conclusive results. Automotive yields              
ambiguous results (correlated when weighted, uncorrelated when unweighted); a tentative explanation,           
which would require a more in-depth analysis out of the scope of this paper, may lie in the presence of                    
numerous “smaller” partners, playing a minor role. Links implying these partners are weaker, and a               
more clear-cut HK structure appears when considering the most economically important subsidiaries            
only, connected by stronger links. The root of this discrepancy might be traced back in the bulk of                  
smaller partners whose importance is correctly rescaled through the links’ weight, thus evidencing the              
correlation with the HK. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Hypotheses test results, unweighted (left) and weighted (right) columns 
 UNWEIGHTED WEIGHTED 
 MRH Rejected? ChiSq p-val MRH Rejected? ChiSq p-val 
Overall YES * 72.15 0.013 NO 56.18 0.080 
1975 YES * 45.65 0.039 NO 56.10 0.140 
1985 YES *** 61.07 0.001 YES *** 96.70 0.000 
1995 YES *** 92.77 0.000 YES *** 91.64 0.000 
2005 YES * 72.15 0.013 NO 56.18 0.080 
ASEAN YES * 52.68 0.030 YES *** 67.83 0.000 
China and Taiwan YES *** 77.51 0.000 YES *** 57.37 0.000 
Northern America YES * 78.96 0.011 YES *** 77.50 0.000 
EU NO 41.55 0.254 NO 49.11 0.150 
Automobiles and Parts NO 70.39 0.982 YES *** 91.10 0.000 
Food NO 45.67 0.320 NO 45.67 0.310 
Chemicals and Pharma YES *** 73.36 0.000 YES *** 63.43 0.000 
Textiles NO 23.32 0.080 NO 28.77 1.000 
Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p <  .05 
 
In order to assess the validity of our findings, the results for every hypothesis tested have been                 
contrasted to an alternative network Configuration Model (Newman 2003), where the network            
structure is destroyed, while preserving the degree for single nodes, through a random rewiring process.               
Intuitively, this procedure is equivalent to blindly creating economic partnerships. In every single             
instance, any hint of significance disappears completely, showing p-values very close to 1. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 5. Worldwide Japanese investors network: business ties and Big-6 membership.  
Highlighted: Mitsubishi and Mitsui clusters 
 
 
VII. Conclusions 
 
In this work, we have presented an analysis of the TKZ dataset, using community detection               
tools, that led us to reject the MRH in the strong form. Indeed, we were able to display quantitative                   
evidence that the communities embedded in Japanese business networks strongly correlate with the HK              
structure described in the 2000 “Keiretsu Survey” dataset. 
To give a brief summarizing overview, as a first step, we extracted from the 2006 TKZ dataset a                  
graph of co-ownership, so that two firms are linked in our approach if they both invest in an overseas                   
subsidiary. Through community detection algorithms, the taxonomy of high-density clusters emerged           
from this graph so that each firm was classified into one cluster, as described in Sec. VI. This                  
classification, purely arising from explicit business ties (the co-ownership), was then compared to the              
Keiretsu one, described in the 2000 TKZ dataset. 
Our results, summarized in Table 4, strongly point to a clear correlation between the intrinsic               
network organization and the HK, albeit with some fluctuations when one considers more specific              
subsets, eventually flawed by the lack of statistics, as for the investments in Europe and the food                 
industry.  
Another interesting point unveiled by the analysis is, in the automotive sector, the discrepancy              
between the clear correlation shown by the weighted network with respect to the unweighted              
configuration. 
Finally, to test the soundness of our findings, we provided, as a comparison, a null model by                 
shuffling the links and destroying the existing correlations with the Configuration Model. This test,              
disrupting any network structure, leads to p values near to 1 and, thus, further proves that the Japanese                  
business network bears a strong intrinsic mark in its organization. 
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